ENGL 105.93 - Anders Juengst

Abstract: Since their inception, military unmanned aerial vehicles have been a topic of heated discussion, and when Edward Snowden leaked documents detailing the number and scope of drone strikes undertaken by the American government, the public was shocked. Over 2,000 strikes have occurred in the Middle East since President Obama took office. Some believe these drone strikes are illegal, immoral assassinations, while others deem them necessary for the security of the nation. Digging deep, it becomes increasingly apparent that the Obama administration betrayed the trust of the people by keeping the drone program secret for so long, and drone strikes are not a cut and dry issue. The government’s secretive and frequent use of drone strikes is worrying, but use of unmanned systems has benefits when compared to attack aircraft with pilots in the cockpit.

Throughout the years, the battlefield has changed immensely, and those changes have been driven by the advent of new technology. From spears, to swords, to firearms, and now in the modern day, drones, new military technology has turned the tide of wars. America’s use of the MQ-1 “Predator” in the war on terror has changed the way the American military searches for and eliminates high value targets and the public’s perception of government surveillance.

To fully understand the benefits and disadvantages of drone use, it’s important to know the capabilities of modern UAVs. In this article, I will only discuss the United States Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator as it is the most popular and numerous of the United States Armed Force’s unmanned arsenal, but multiple, specialized unmanned aerial systems are in use and many more are in development. Conceived in the early ‘90s, the Predator is an unmanned, fixed-wing aircraft capable of flying to targets more than seven hundred miles away (“MQ-1B”). Although the Predator originally was only a reconnaissance aircraft, it was weaponized in the late 1990s. The Predator now carries two Hellfire anti-tank missiles, four Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, or six Griffin air-to-ground missiles (“MQ-1B”). Only after the addition of these armaments did the Air Force and Central Intelligence Agency fully realize the potential of the Predator.

The Predator UAV, for better or worse, has become a staple of American surveillance and interdiction across the globe. The newfound ability to precisely strike within a few meters of a target while the pilots sit safely in a trailer seven thousand miles away has led to a dramatic increase in the amount of American drone strikes during the war in Afghanistan and the hunt for leaders of terror organizations. Instead of sending in a special operations ground team to intervene face to face (or maybe gun to gun), the US Joint Special Operations Command, or JSOC, can use a drone without risking the lives of American soldiers or pilots. Other times, it simply is not possible to send a team to investigate or interdict against high value targets, such as when JSOC and the CIA seeked to eliminate the surviving leaders of Al-Qaeda who were hiding deep in the Hindu Kush mountains in northeastern Afghanistan (Scahill). The distance from US bases and size of the area of operation was too large for ground units to be used, so Americans used Predator drones to search for and eliminate targets. In this effort, the Predator proved how effective and deadly it could be when used frequently and on a large scale.

The American public and rest of global society were generally supportive of the use of drones up until 2013, when Edward Snowden, a former CIA contractor, leaked thousands of documents from the NSA, CIA, and Department of Defense detailing the vast scope of surveillance undertaken by American intelligence agencies, both domestically and globally. After the documents were parsed, readers were astounded by a set of presentation slides on American Drone operations in the Middle East. Following the leak, journalists at First Look Media founded The Intercept, a publication dedicated to covering and analyzing leaked government documents. The Intercept’s first major publication was a long-form piece called “The Drone Papers,” in which the writers dug deep into the CIA’s drone use and explained to the public the many negative aspects of drone warfare.

Perhaps the most astounding and prominent issue found in Snowden’s leaks was the sheer number of people killed by drone strikes over the course of Operation Haymaker, a CIA operation hunting Al-Qaeda in northeastern Afghanistan. The CIA launched 27 Hellfire missiles at enemy targets, and seventy percent of the time, the missile found its mark. At first, this might seem like a success, but the amount of collateral damage from these strikes is astounding (Scahill). In those 27 strikes, and estimated 155 other people were killed by the missiles, meaning nine out of every ten people eliminated by drones during the operation alone were not the target (Scahill). Additionally, the leaked documents provided insight into how the CIA was acquiring their targets. For years, the CIA and NSA have been tracking the cell phones of their targets in the Middle East, but recently many drone strikes have become dependent solely on electronic surveillance rather that human intelligence (Scahill). This meant that a person could be deemed an enemy of the United States and receive a missile into their house if they called the wrong number a few times.

After the leaks revealed the sheer number of people these drones were killing, the American public began questioning the legality and ethics behind the Obama Administration’s trigger-happy use of the Predator. In May of 2013, attempting to reestablish some trust between the people and government, the White House posted a press release titled “Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside of the United States and Areas of Active Hostility.” The document outlines the administration’s supposed rules of engagement and how they choose between capturing and killing targets. One important and controversial quote from the article states that for a strike to occur, they must have “Near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed,” (“Fact Sheet”). However, looking at the numbers of the collateral damage during Operation Haymaker, it seems that the CIA has no care for how many people they kill in a single strike. In addition, the guidelines state that there must be “Near certainty that the terrorist target is present,” (Scahill). Despite this rule, the CIA regularly just targets cell phones with no definite information as to who has been using it. The definition of “near certainty” is quite loose in the eyes of the Obama Administration, and the American public’s fear and distrust of drone strikes is justified.

Despite the Obama administration’s seemingly careless use of drone strikes, the secrecy with which they carried out drone operations, and even the resulting negative connotation surrounding the word “drone,” William Saletan of Slate argues that the Predator UAV is the best tool for the American government to use in the fight against terrorists. In his article “In Defense of Drones,” he compares civilian casualties stemming from modern use of the Predator to WWII, Vietnam, Iraq, and the beginning of the War in Afghanistan. He claims drones are “the worst form of warfare in the history of the world, except for all the others,” (Saletan).

Saletan cites a UN postwar report from the Kosovo War that gives an idea of the inaccuracies and mass casualties caused by NATO airstrikes. “NATO’s bombing campaign killed about 500 Serbian civilians, almost matching the 600 enemy soldiers who died in action,” (Saletan). An important distinction here is the difference between unintended targets and civilians. The 155 non-targeted people killed by drones during Operation Haymaker were not necessarily civilians; it’s likely they were low-ranking members of Al-Qaeda, and therefore still classified by the CIA as enemies. The 500 civilians killed by Kosovo airstrikes were non-combatants who had no intention of fighting in the war (Garlasco). The reason the civilian death rate from these airstrikes was so high is that for the safety of pilots and their aircraft, NATO required pilots to fly at or above 15,000 feet, meaning that often pilots could not see the ground to acquire and verify targets. Drones, however, do not have this problem. They can be flown at low altitudes without risking the lives of their pilots, and the ordinance of the Predator, a Hellfire missile, is much more accurate than bombs. Saletan goes on to analyze several sources on the effectiveness of Drone strikes, concluding that overall, Predator drone strikes in the Middle East have a civilian casualty rate of six percent, meaning for every 16 enemies killed, one civilian was caught in the attack. Compared to the 45% civilian casualty rate of the Kosovo airstrikes, the Predator’s numbers are favorable (Saletan). Overall, the Predator’s strongest asset is its ability to precisely hit a target while minimizing civilian casualties, and keeping American troops.

Obviously, the Obama Administration argues that drone strikes in recent years have been for the greater good, and Saletan, writing for Slate, a left-wing news site, wants to protect the Administration’s reputation. On the other hand, Glenn Greenwald, founder of The Intercept, aligns with neither political party, admitting in the preface to his 2006 book How Would a Patriot Act? that he did not agree with either presidential candidate in 2000 or 2004, so he refrained from voting. Greenwald’s lack of political allegiance and distrust of the political machine is strengthened by his coverage of the Edward Snowden leaks, an act condemned by both major parties. In his work for The Intercept, Greenwald sustains his non-aligned political agenda. Despite Saletan and Greenwald’s efforts to write stories aligned with their political views, Saletan protecting and Greenwald exposing the CIA, both articles are backed up with reputable evidence and written with limited bias.

Saletan makes a strong argument in favor of drones through his use of statistics and logic, but Greenwald and “The Drone Papers” counters with a moral argument about the secrecy of the drone program. Unlike the rest of the armed forces, unmanned aircraft are almost invisible. Drones can fly out of secluded airstrips with barebones crew, hiding entire assassination operations from civilians, both on foreign and U.S. soil. Up until the Snowden leaks, the American people had no clue as to the scope and power of the CIA’s UAV program (Scahill). In this fact a dilemma arises: The CIA should not be allowed to operate its drones acting as the police, judge, and executioner, without a jury, the American voters. A pillar of American self-governance is the public’s ability to influence those in power, through protest and votes. During the Vietnam War, anti-war protesters were able to influence military leaders and politicians, bringing the war to an end. In present day, however, the secrecy of the drone program is taking away the American public’s ability to limit and oversee its own government. The President and CIA must work together to regain the trust of the people by communicating their intentions for and use of unmanned aircraft.

The fact of the matter is that undoubtedly, war is messy. There is no cookie cutter one-size-fits-all solution to every problem. It’s hard to determine who’s who and the good from the bad. While American use of drones in the hunt for Al-Qaeda was necessary, the level of secrecy by which the Obama Administration carried out its attacks was unjustified. Keeping the public in the dark for so long only to have them appalled by the revelations brought forth by Edward Snowden’s leaks was a poor decision and show of leadership by the President and his advisors. However, compared to the inaccurate, broad, destructive carpet bombings of the Vietnam war, the Predator is like a sharpened scalpel compared to the hacksaw that is the B-52 bomber, and when trying to dismantle a complex, global terror organization such as Al-Qaeda, a scalpel is the best tool for the job.

Abstract: Since their inception, military unmanned aerial vehicles have been a topic of heated discussion, and when Edward Snowden leaked documents detailing the number and scope of drone strikes undertaken by the American government, the public was shocked. Over 2,000 strikes have occurred in the Middle East since President Obama took office. Some believe these drone strikes are illegal, immoral assassinations, while others deem them necessary for the security of the nation. Digging deep, it becomes increasingly apparent that the Obama administration betrayed the trust of the people by keeping the drone program secret for so long, and drone strikes are not a black and white cut and dry issue. The governmentshould be held accountable's secretive and frequent use of drone strikes is worrying, but use of unmanned systems has benefits when compared to attack aircraft with pilots in the cockpit.

Throughout the years, the battlefield has changed immensely, and those changes have been driven by the advent of new technology. From spears, to swords, to firearms, and now in the modern day, drones, new military technology has turned the tide of wars. America’s use of the MQ-1 “Predator” in the war on terror has changed the way the American military searches for and eliminates high value targets and the public’s perception of government surveillance.

To fully understand the benefits and disadvantages of drone use, it’s important to know the capabilities of modern UAVs. In this article, I will only discuss the United States Air Force’s MQ-1 Predator as it is the most popular and numerous of the United States Armed Force’s unmanned arsenal, but multiple, different specialized unmanned aerial systems are in use and many more are in development. Conceived in the early ‘90s, the Predator is an unmanned, fixed-wing aircraft capable of flying to targets more than seven hundred miles away (“MQ-1B”). Although it the Predator originally was intended to be only a reconnaissance aircraft, it was weaponized in the late 1990s. The Predator now carries two Hellfire anti-tank missiles, four Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, or six Griffin air-to-ground missiles (“MQ-1B”). Only after the addition of these armaments did the Air Force and Central Intelligence Agency fully realize the potential of the Predator.

The Predator UAV, for better or worse, has become a staple of American surveillance and interdiction across the globe. The newfound ability to precisely strike within a few meters of a target while the pilots sit safely in a trailer seven thousand miles away has led to a dramatic increase in the amount of American drone strikes during the war in Afghanistan and the hunt for leaders of terror organizations. Instead of sending in a special operations ground team to intervene face to face (or maybe gun to gun), the US Joint Special Operations Command, or JSOC, can use a drone without risking the lives of American soldiers or pilots. Other times, it simply is not possible to send a team to investigate or interdict against high value targets, such as when JSOC and the CIA seeked to eliminate the surviving leaders of Al-Qaeda who were hiding deep in the Hindu Kush mountains in northeastern Afghanistan (Scahill). The distance from US bases and size of the area of operation was too large for ground units to be used, so Americans used Predator drones to search for and eliminate targets. In this effort, the Predator proved how effective and deadly it could be when used frequently and on a large scale.

The American public and rest of global society were generally supportive of the use of drones up until 2013, when Edward Snowden, a former CIA contractor, leaked thousands of documents from the NSA, CIA, and Department of Defense detailing the vast scope of surveillance undertaken by American intelligence agencies, both domestically and globally. After the documents were parsed, readers were astounded by a set of presentation slides on American Drone operations in the Middle East. Following the leak, journalists at First Look Media founded The Intercept, a publication dedicated to covering and analyzing leaked government documents. The Intercept’s first major publication was a long-form piece called “The Drone Papers,” in which the writers dug deep into the CIA’s drone use and explained to the public the many negative aspects of drone warfare.

Perhaps the most astounding and prominent issue found in Snowden’s leaks was the sheer number of people killed by drone strikes over the course of Operation Haymaker, a CIA operation hunting Al-Qaeda in northeastern Afghanistan. The CIA launched 27 Hellfire missiles at enemy targets, and seventy percent of the time, the missile found its mark. At first, this might seem like a success, but the amount of collateral damage from these strikes is astounding (Scahill). In those 27 strikes, and estimated 155 other people were killed by the missiles, meaning nine out of every ten people eliminated by drones during the operation alone were not the target (Scahill). Additionally, the leaked documents provided insight into how the CIA was acquiring their targets. For years, the CIA and NSA have been tracking the cell phones of their targets in the Middle East, but recently many drone strikes have become dependent solely on electronic surveillance rather that human intelligence (Scahill). This meant that a person could be deemed an enemy of the United States and receive a missile into their house if they called the wrong number a few times.

After the leaks revealed the sheer number of people these drones were killing, the American public began questioning the legality and ethics behind the Obama Administration’s trigger-happy use of the Predator. In May of 2013, attempting to reestablish some trust between the people and government, the White House posted a press release titled “Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside of the United States and Areas of Active Hostility.” The document outlines the administration’s supposed rules of engagement and how they choose between capturing and killing targets. One important and controversial quote from the article states that for a strike to occur, they must have “Near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed,” (“Fact Sheet”). However, looking at the numbers of the collateral damage during Operation Haymaker, it seems that the CIA has no care for how many people they kill in a single strike. In addition, the guidelines state that there must be “Near certainty that the terrorist target is present,” (Scahill). Despite this rule, the CIA regularly just targets cell phones with no definite information as to who has been using it. The definition of “near certainty” is quite loose in the eyes of the Obama Administration, and the American public deserves to be alarmed by’s fear and distrust of drone strikes is justified.

Despite the Obama administration’s seemingly careless use of drone strikes, the secrecy with which they carried out drone operations, and even the resulting negative connotation surrounding the word “drone,” William Saletan of Slate argues that the Predator UAV is the best tool for the American government to use in the fight against terrorists. In his article “In Defense of Drones,” he compares civilian casualties stemming from modern use of the Predator to WWII, Vietnam, Iraq, and the beginning of the War in Afghanistan. He claims drones are “the worst form of warfare in the history of the world, except for all the others,” (Saletan).

Saletan cites a UN postwar report from the Kosovo War that gives an idea of the inaccuracies and mass casualties caused by NATO airstrikes. “NATO’s bombing campaign killed about 500 Serbian civilians, almost matching the 600 enemy soldiers who died in action,” (Saletan). An important distinction here is the difference between unintended targets and civilians. The 155 non-targeted people killed by drones during Operation Haymaker were not necessarily civilians; it’s likely they were low-ranking members of Al-Qaeda, and therefore still classified by the CIA as enemies. The 500 civilians killed by Kosovo airstrikes were non-combatants who had no intention of fighting in the war (Garlasco). The reason the civilian death rate from these airstrikes was so high is that for the safety of pilots and their aircraft, NATO required pilots to fly at or above 15,000 feet, meaning that often pilots could not see the ground to acquire and verify targets. Drones, however, do not have this problem. They can be flown at low altitudes without risking the lives of their pilots, and the ordinance of the Predator, a Hellfire missile, is much more accurate than bombs. Saletan goes on to analyze several sources on the effectiveness of Drone strikes, concluding that overall, Predator drone strikes in the Middle East have a civilian casualty rate of six percent, meaning for every 16 enemies killed, one civilian was caught in the attack. Compared to the 45% civilian casualty rate of the Kosovo airstrikes, the Predator’s numbers are favorable (Saletan). Overall, the Predator’s strongest asset is its ability to precisely hit a target while minimizing civilian casualties, and keeping American troops is one of its strongest aspects.

Obviously, the Obama Administration argues that drone strikes in recent years have been for the greater good, and Saletan, writing for Slate, a left-wing news site, wants to protect the Administration’s reputation. On the other hand, Glenn Greenwald, founder of The Intercept, aligns with neither political party, admitting in the preface to his 2006 book How Would a Patriot Act? that he did not agree with either presidential candidate in 2000 or 2004, so he refrained from voting. Greenwald’s lack of political allegiance and distrust of the political machine is strengthened by his coverage of the Edward Snowden leaks, an act condemned by both major parties. In his work for The Intercept, Greenwald sustains his non-aligned political agenda. Despite Saletan and Greenwald’s efforts to write stories aligned with their political views, Saletan protecting and Greenwald exposing the CIA, both articles are backed up with reputable evidence and written with limited bias.

Saletan makes a strong argument in favor of drones through his use of statistics and logic, but Greenwald and “The Drone Papers” counters with a moral argument about the secrecy of the drone program. Unlike the rest of the armed forces, unmanned aircraft are almost invisible. Drones can fly out of secluded airstrips with barebones crew, hiding entire assassination operations from civilians, both on foreign and U.S. soil. Up until the Snowden leaks, the American people had no clue as to the scope and power of the CIA’s UAV program (Scahill). In this fact a dilemma arises: The CIA should not be allowed to operate its drones acting as the police, judge, and executioner, without a jury, the American voters. A pillar of American self-governance is the public’s ability to influence those in power, through protest and votes. During the Vietnam War, anti-war protesters were able to influence military leaders and politicians, bringing the war to an end. In present day, however, the secrecy of the drone program is taking away the American public’s ability to limit and oversee its own government. The President and CIA must work together to regain the trust of the people by communicating their intentions for and use of unmanned aircraft.

The fact of the matter is that undoubtedly, war is messy. There is no cookie cutter one-size-fits-all solution to every problem. It’s hard to determine who’s who and the good from the bad. While American use of drones in the hunt for Al-Qaeda was necessary, the level of secrecy by which the Obama Administration carried out its attacks was unjustified. Keeping the public in the dark for so long only to have them appalled by the revelations brought forth by Edward Snowden’s leaks was a poor decision and show of leadership by the President and his advisors. However, compared to the inaccurate, broad, destructive carpet bombings of the Vietnam war, the Predator is like a sharpened scalpel compared to the hacksaw that is the B-52 bomber, and when trying to dismantle a complex, global terror organization such as Al-Qaeda, a scalpel is the best tool for the job.